PRODUCTS · POS · FRAUD CONTROL
LEYSCO100 · POS FRAUD CONTROL — LIVE IN PRODUCTION

A till the cashier can't quietly rob.

Every void, discount and refund passes a supervisor, sensitive actions need a fingerprint, and hash chains stop quiet edits: loss prevention built into the till.

Branch 2pos at samwest
3 controlsfraud controls built-in
6 railspayment rails
SAMWEST · POS live
ON LEYSCO100LivePOS Live at SAMWEST, Branch 2. Product capabilities include built-in approval chains, hash-chain audit and biometric 2FA.
ON LEYSCO AKILIRoadmapPOS, tills and checkout are Leysco100-family products; a Leysco Akili module is on the roadmap.
The category

Retail POS + loss prevention (Kenya)

The names you'll be comparing

SAP Customer Checkout · Odoo POS · Loyverse

The difference

Loss prevention is built into the till — approval chains, a hash-chain audit and biometric 2FA — not an analytics report you run after the money has already walked.

APPROVAL QUEUE · TERMINAL 3SAMPLE DATA · 11 JUL 2026
ACTIONCASHIERAMOUNTAPPROVED BY
Void SALE-4472MARY W.−1,180JANE · SUP
Discount 10%MARY W.−560JANE · SUP
Refund SALE-4460MARY W.−2,400JANE · SUP
Price overridePETER K.—DECLINED
4 requests3 approved · 1 declined
EVERY VOID / DISCOUNT / REFUND STOPS FOR A SUPERVISOR — NOTHING SELF-APPROVES

Nothing risky clears without a supervisor.

Approval

Voids, discounts and refunds stop at the till until a supervisor approves them — and an unauthorised price override is declined outright — every one recorded with who asked, who approved or declined, and how much was at stake.

HASH-CHAINED JOURNALSAMPLE DATA
SALE-4471 3,240 hash(0000 · txn) = a7f3
SALE-4472 1,180 hash(a7f3 · txn) = c19b
VOID-4472 −1,180 hash(c19b · txn) = 4e82
SALE-4473 5,600 hash(4e82 · txn) = d5a1
SALE-4474 890 hash(d5a1 · txn) = 9c30
EACH LINE HASHES THE PREVIOUS HASH — EDIT ONE, BREAK ALL AFTER IT

A ledger no one can quietly rewrite.

Audit

Each transaction is hashed together with the hash of the one before it, so the log is a chain — change any past line and every hash after it breaks. The audit trail is tamper-evident by construction, not by policy.

BIOMETRIC 2FA EVENTSSAMPLE DATA
EVENTCASHIERACTIONAUTH
No-sale drawerMARY W.openFINGERPRINT
VoidMARY W.SALE-4472FINGERPRINT
Price overridePETER K.—DECLINED
3 events2 authorised · 1 declined
SENSITIVE ACTIONS BIND TO A PERSON — NOT A SHARED SUPERVISOR PIN

A fingerprint at the sensitive edge.

Identity

Opening the drawer without a sale, voiding, overriding a price — the actions that leak money — take a biometric, so an action is tied to a person, not a shared PIN whispered down the line.

Z-REPORT · TERMINAL 3 · CLOSESAMPLE DATA
LINEAMOUNT
Gross sales284,600
Voids−1,180
Discounts−560
Refunds−2,400
Net sales280,460
Cash declared96,200
M-Pesa148,900
Card35,360
VARIANCE0
GROSS − VOIDS − DISCOUNTS − REFUNDS = NET = CASH + M-PESA + CARD · VARIANCE 0

The shift closes to the shilling.

Reconciliation

At close, the Z-report totals gross, voids and discounts to net, then reconciles net to the cash, M-Pesa and card actually taken — variance surfaced, not smoothed over.

Everything at the till.

In this line
Cashier Till / Checkout (POS core)LiveOffline-first Flutter till, barcode scan.
Kenya Fraud Control SuiteLiveApproval chains, hash-chain, biometric 2FA.
KRA Fiscalisation at the tillLiveDart-native TIMS/eTIMS, multi-device.
Multi-rail Payments at tillLiveM-Pesa STK, DTB STK, card, cash.
Shift & Cash ManagementLiveX/Z reports, float, variance, handover.
Retail Inventory OperationsLiveMulti-warehouse, transfers, counts, GR/GI.
Retail Pricing EngineLiveLocal price resolution, no SAP round-trip.
Customer-Facing DisplayLiveLive second-screen cart + total.
Walking Cashier (queue-busting)LiveMobile sale on a Sunmi in the aisle.
Peripheral / Device FrameworkLivePrinters, scanners, drawer, scales.
Retail Banking moduleDesignedDeposits, outgoing payments, statement import.
Loyalty Programme EngineRoadmapEnrolment, points, redemption, tiers.

Every entry is sealed to the one before it.

Signature · Sample data

The till writes every event — sale, void, refund — as a line that hashes the line before it, approvals sealed into the same record. Nothing is quietly editable after the fact: change any past line and every hash after it stops verifying.

Till audit chain · Terminal 3 · sample data
SALE-4471KES 3,240prev 0000hash a7f3
SALE-4472KES 1,180prev a7f3hash c19b
VOID-4472SUP · JANEKES −1,180prev c19bhash 4e82
SALE-4473KES 5,600prev 4e82hash d5a1
SALE-4474KES 890prev d5a1hash 9c30
edit SALE-4471 after the fact → a7f3 breaks → c19b 4e82 d5a1 9c30 — every hash after it breaks
Each line hashes the one before it — change any past transaction and every hash after it breaks. Scope: Kenya.

Leysco POS is Live at SAMWEST, Branch 2. The product includes built-in supervisor approval chains, hash-chain audit and biometric 2FA for sensitive actions.

The till is a Leysco100-family product.

Built for operations that…
  • run tills where shrinkage and cashier fraud are the real risk
  • need voids, discounts and refunds gated by a supervisor, on the record
  • want an audit trail no one can quietly edit after close
  • reconcile every shift to the shilling across cash, M-Pesa and card
The old way → this way

A spreadsheet of voids reviewed next week, after the cash is gone → controls in the till, at the moment of the sale

Put the controls where the money moves.

Implemented by the team that built it. Nairobi · EAT.
See the controls
Talk to us · WhatsApp +254 780 457 591